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Death Damages and Conflicts of Laws
Marvin D. Silver*
A T COMMON LAW, as Lord Ellenborough stiffly declared, no
right of action existed for wrongful death.' Since the
adoption of the Fatal Accidents Act of 18462 in the United
Kingdom, each of the fifty United States has created by statute3
a similar right of action which pertains to the survivors or to the
estate of the decedent whose death resulted from the wrongful
acts of another. During recent years, fourteen states have in-
corporated within their wrongful death statutes a maximum
limitation on the amount of damages recoverable. 4 These re-
strictions consistently trouble the courts when a wrongful death
occurs in one of these limiting states and the suit is brought
elsewhere. However, the courts have, with a few exceptions,
held steadfastly to the principle that in an action for wrongful
death "the law of the place of wrong governs the right of action
* A.B., Ohio University; Third year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493, 495 (1808): "In a civil court the death of
a human being cannot be complained of as an injury." This pronounce-
ment by Lord Ellenborough was unanimously accepted by the American
courts.
2 St. 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act, which
provided in part:
That whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would,
(if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every
such case the person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of a person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
3 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann., sec. 2125.01 (1953); N. Y. Dec. Est. L.,
sec. 130 (1949); Mich. Stat. Ann., sec. 27.711 (1935). See, Oleck, Damages
to Persons and Property, ch. 18 (1961 revision).
4 Colorado, $25,000, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., sec. 41-1-3 (1953); Connecticut,
$25,000, Conn. Gen. Stat., rev. sec. 52-555 (supp. 1958); Illinois, $30,000, ill.
Rev. Stat., ch. 70, sec. 1, 2 (1959); Kansas, $25,000, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.,
sec. 60-3203 (1949); Maine, $20,000, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., ch. 165, sec. 10
(1954); Massachusetts, $20,000, Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 229, sec. 6E (1955);
Minnesota, $25,000, Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 573.02 (1947); Missouri, $25,000,
Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat., sec. 537.090 (1949); New Hampshire, $25,000,
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., sec. 556.13 (1955); Oregon, $20,000, Ore. Rev.
Stat., sec. 30.020 (1959); South Dakota, $20,000, S. D. Code, sec. 37.2203
(1939); Virginia, $30,000, Va. Code Ann., sec. 8-636 (1950); West Virginia,
$20,000, W. Va. Code Ann., sec. 5475 (1955); Wisconsin, $25,000, Wis. Stat.
Ann., sec. 331.04 (1958). See, Oleck, Damages To Persons & Property,
§ 198A (1961 revision).
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* . .," and that "the place of wrong is in the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable takes place." 5
The Majority Proposition: A Substantive Approach
In an action for wrongful death occurring in Montana, the
United States Supreme Court proclaimed that the foreign law
governs not only the definition of the tort, but also the assess-
ment of damages. Consequently a limitation on the amount re-
coverable, imposed by the Minnesota forum, was inapplicable.6
In 1918, Judge Cardozo, speaking for the court in the land-
mark case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,7 clearly established
New York as accepting the majority proposition that in an action
for wrongful death arising in a foreign state, the lex delicti
governs as to the cause of action and the remedy. Concluding
that the remedy is firmly implanted within the substantive right
of action, he said, "Although the sovereign in its discretion may
refuse its aid to a right created by foreign statute, the courts of
the state have no such power . . .," and "similarity of legislation
shows beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend
the public policy of the forum, but its absence does not prove
the contrary...", and "mere differences of remedy do not count."
5 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, secs. 391, 377 (1934).
6 Northern P. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1894); Slater v. Mexican
Natl. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120 (1904). For controlling state cases, see: Caine
v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 209 Ala. 181, 95 S. 876 (1923); St. Louis v.
Hesterly, 98 Ark. 240, 135 S. W. 874 (1911); Stoltz v. Burlington, 178 F. 2d
514 (10th Cir., Colo., 1949); Reilly v. Antonio, 108 Conn. 436, 143 A. 568
(1928); Southern R. Co. v. Decker, 5 Ga. 21, 62 S. E. 678 (1908); Barnes v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 139 F. Supp. 198 (D. C., Idaho, 1956); Hanna v. Grand
Trunk R. Co., 41 Ill. App. 116 (1891); Laprelle v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 85
F. Supp. 182 (D. C., Kan., 1949); Louisville v. Bryant, 215 Ky. 401, 285
S. W. 245 (1926); Riley v. Lukens, 4 F. Supp. 144 (D. C., Md., 1933);
Jackson v. Anthony, 282 Mass. 540, 185 N. E. 389 (1933); Hupp Motor Car
Co. v. Wadsworth, 113 F. 2d 827 (6th Cir., Mich., 1940); Powell v. Great
Northern R. Co., 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 1017 (1907); Jackson v. St.
Louis, 224 Mo. App. 601, 31 S. W. 2d 250 (1930); Whitney v. Penrod, 149
Neb. 636, 32 N. W. 2d 131 (1948); Robinson v. Dixon, 91 N. H. 29, 13 A.
2d 163 (1940); Giardini v. McAdoo, 93 N. J. L. 138, 107 A. 437 (1919);
Christensen v. Floriston, 29 Nev. 552, 92 P. 210 (1907); Wise v. Hollowell,
205 N. C. 286, 171 S. E. 82 (1933); Caldwell v. Abernathy, 231 N. C. 692,
58 S. E. 2d 763 (1950); Louisville R. Co. v. Greene, 26 Ohio App. 392, 160
N. E. 495 (1927); Dusek v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 F. R. D. 326 (D. C.,
Ohio, 1949), where, in an action in Ohio for wrongful death occurring in
Utah, where funeral expenses were not recoverable, paragraph of com-
plaint seeking recovery of funeral expenses was stricken; Curtiss v. Camp-
bell, 76 F. 2d 84 (3d Cir., Pa., 1935); Nealy v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
121 S. W. 2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App., 1938); Brown v. Perry, 104 Vt. 66, 156
A. 910 (1931); Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S. E. 2d 348 (1943);
Anderson v. Miller, 176 Wis. 528, 187 N. W. 746 (1922).
7 224 N. Y. 99 at 110, 111, 120 N. E. 198 at 201, 202 (1918).
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The court in Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.8 followed the
holding in Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.9 Both cases involved
an action brought by a widow to recover for injuries to and
death of her husband, who purchased a ticket at New York for
a flight to Boston, and was killed as a result of a crash in Con-
necticut. The Maynard case confirmed New York's stand with the
majority ruling, by upholding a judgment entered on a verdict
returned by a jury instructed to limit damages to $20,000, on
the ground that the action was governed by the lex loci delicti
and not by the place where the contract was made.
The Minority Proposition: A Procedural Approach
Cases abound which declare that the law of the forum
determines the procedure of the courts and the remedies which
are available to suitors.10 To date, however, only two states"
8 178 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir., N. Y., 1949).
9 193 Misc. 395 at 397, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 568 at 570 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County,
1948). The court, concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish a cause
of action in contract, explained that "although couched in contract language,
it is obvious that liability, if any, will be predicated upon proof of negli-
gence. Where, as here, the gravamen of the cause of action is an alleged
breach of a duty through negligence, the action is governed by the appli-
cable law of torts, even though the allegations refer to a breach of contract."
Further explanation of this point is made in Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R.
Co. v. Groin, 142 Ky. 51, 133 S. W. 977 (1911), which determined that
liability of a carrier in tort, for personal injuries suffered by a passenger
while being carried under a contract for transportation from Kentucky to
New Jersey, must be governed by the law of Pennsylvania, where the
injury occurred, as against the contention that this rule should not be
applied, for the reason that the contract of carriage was made in another
state-the forum. The court based its decision on the ground that while
the tort was traceable to the contractual relation which existed between
the carrier and the passenger, yet the duty of a carrier to carry a passenger
safely arises not primarily from the contract, but from the law, and that,
therefore, the law of the place where the injury took place governed the
liability of the carrier.
10 For typical cases, see: Nelson v. American Employers Ins. Co., 258 Wis.
252, 45 N. W. 2d 681 (1951)-lex fori, in a separate property state, did not
preclude wife from bringing action against her husband for injuries to her
person occurring in New Mexico, a community property state; First Natl.
Bank in Greensburgh v. M. & G. Convoy, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 494 (D. C., Pa.,
1952)-lex fori determined, as a procedural matter, that subrogation of
parties was permissive; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kendall, 225 Ark.
731, 284 S. W. 2d 863 (1955)-lex fori determined admissibility of evidence in
contract action arising in foreign state; Bernkrant v. Fowler, 8 Cal. Rptr.
326, 185 A. C. A. 436 (1960)-lex fori determined effect of oral agreement in
contract arising in foreign state; Kipp v. International Harvester Co., 23
Misc. 2d 649, 200 N. Y. S. 2d 977 (1959)-lex fori determined joint or several
liability of master and servant in action arising in foreign state; Ley v.
Simmons, 249 S. W. 2d 808 (Ky. App., 1952)-action in Kentucky to enforce
1930 Florida judgment was barred by Kentucky 15 year statute of limita-
(Continued on next page)
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follow the proposition that in an action for wrongful death oc-
curring in a foreign state, the remedy and extent of recovery
is a procedural matter and consequently is governed by the lex
fori.
In the recent case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
the court, disposing of the plaintiff's complaint ex contractu,
declared, "it is law long settled that wrongful death actions, be-
ing unknown to the common law, derive from statutes only and
that the statute which governs such an action is that of the place
of the wrong.' u
2
The court then commenced, against the pointed dissents of
two Justices, to brush aside the cobwebs which had gathered
on the forty-two year extinct ruling established in Wooden v.
Western N. Y. & Pa. R. Co., and from the opinion delivered by
Judge Finch therein, declared that the "restriction pertains to
the remedy rather than the right.. ." and "does not strictly affect
the rule of damages, but rather the extent of damages; and that
extent, as limited or unlimited, does not enter into any definition
of the right enforced, or the cause of action permitted to be
prosecuted."' 3
Along with the Wooden case holding, the Kilberg majority
proffered five cases in support of the contention that remedial
and substantive "shade into each other constantly . . ." and
that "the law of the forum normally determines for itself' 14
whether a given question is one of substance or procedure.
(Continued from preceding page)
tions, though such action would not have been barred under Florida statute
of limitations.
11 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N. Y. 2d 34, 172 N. E. 2d 526 (1961).
Armbruster v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 166 Iowa 155, 147, N. W. 337 (1914),
held that the amount of damages recoverable pertains to the remedy and
is controlled by the lex fori, since they do not involve any substantive right.
Here, the lex delicti permitted compensatory and punitive damages, but
the lex fori, allowing only compensation, ruled against punitive recovery.
Other than to this extent, no Iowa case has ruled that a 'monetary' limita-
tion imposed by a foreign lex delicti is inapplicable in an Iowa forum.
12 9 N. Y. 2d at 38, 172 N. E. 2d at 527.
13 126 N. Y. at 16, 26 N. E. at 1051 (1891). The court raised a very good
point in dicta; query: were the defendant a corporation chartered under
Pennsylvania law and not, as here, chartered under New York law, would
the New York court apply the Pennsylvania law and not allow the foreign
corporation the benefit of the New York remedial limitation (which at that
time was $5,000)?
14 Leflar, Conflict of Laws, sec. 60 (1959).
Sept., 1961
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1. Murray v. N. Y. 0. & W. R. Co.15 held that in transitory
actions of this nature, the general rule is that matters of sub-
stantive law are controlled by the lex loci delicti, while pro-
cedural matters are governed by the lex fori. However, the
Murray court did in no measure determine that in an action
for wrongful death the amount recoverable is a procedural
matter, but only that the forum would permit, as a procedural
determination, the subrogation of a new plaintiff for the de-
ceased plaintiff, since the deceased plaintiff had initiated the
action within the time limitation required by the forum in tort
claims.
2. Referring to Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz,16
the Kilberg majority declared that "as to conflict of law rules
it is of course settled that the law of the forum is usually in
control as to procedures, including remedies." 17 Establishing
that whatever goes to the substance of an obligation is governed
by the lex loci, the Franklin court determined that the lex loci
governs as to the applicable statute of frauds. We must assume
then, that the Kilberg majority would deem a statute of frauds
to go more to the substance of an obligation, in contract, than
does the issue of damages for wrongful death, in tort.
3. Mertz v. Mertz"' involved an action brought in New York
by a wife against her husband for personal injuries inflicted upon
her in Connecticut. Dismissing the complaint, the court explained
that although the forum recognizes the wrong, it denies remedy
for such wrong by attaching to the person of the spouse a dis-
ability to sue, and the court will not enforce a foreign remedy
which is contrary to the strong public policy of New York.
4. Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud19 held that damages
for a breach of contract pertain to remedy and are not a matter
of substantive right.
15 242 App. Div. 374, 275 N. Y. S. 10 (1934).
16 247 N. Y. 465, 160 N. E. 916 (1928).
17 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N. Y. 2d at 41, 172 N. E. 2d at 529.
18 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. 2d 597 (1936). Query, whether the ruling on this
issue is applicable to cases for wrongful death and conflicts of laws wherein
every American jurisdiction affords a right of recovery?
19 248 Mich. 85, 226 N. W. 883 (1929). The issue did not involve a determi-
nation based on tort law, and thus is clearly not in point re an action for
wrongful death. For the controlling Michigan case in point, see, Hupp
Motor Car Co. v. Wadsworth, 113 F. 2d 827 (6 Cir., Mich., 1940).
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5. Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc.2 0 merely in-
volved the validity of a contractual limitation upon a carrier's
common law liability and thus has no applicability to the ques-
tion presented in the Kilberg case.
The legal effect of these supposedly supporting cases may
clearly be controlling regarding the issues determined therein.
It appears, however, that the Kilberg court bent slightly back-
wards to extend these cases to the issue at hand.
A Contractual Approach
In Patterson v. American Airlines, Inc.,21 the court held that
a breach of contract action could be maintained although the
basis of the action was a breach of duty through negligence.
Neither the New York forum, where the flight originated, nor
New Jersey, where the fatal crash occurred, imposed a limita-
tion on damages recoverable. The court relied on two cases for
support of its decision.
Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd.,22 determined that the air
travel tickets purchased by the deceased were in the nature of
a single contract, though there were separate flights involved,
and consequently the contract fell within a classification of
international carriage, as defined by the Warsaw Convention of
1929 and given the force of law in the United Kingdom by the
Carriage by Air Act of 1932.23 Under this aspect, Lord Camp-
bell's Act was found inapplicable and recovery was limited to
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, 125,000 French francs
(£1670). A minority of the court discussed in the affirmative
whether an action would lie for wrongful death under the pro-
visions of Lord Campbell's Act where an act, neglect or default
causing the death was a breach of duty imposed by contract.
The Patterson court, relying on this distinction, failed to recog-
nize the vast authority which cements the rule that in wrongful
death actions arising from a breach of contract due to negligence,
the action is governed, not by the lex loci contracti, but rather
by the lex loci delicti.
20 266 N. Y. 2d 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935).
21 3 Avi. 18, 214 (S. D. N. Y., 1953).
22 1 Avi. 622 (Ct. of App. Eng. 1936).
23 Halsbury's Stat. of Eng. (2d ed., 1948).
Sept., 1961
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Greco v. Kresge Co. 24 was an action for wrongful death
caused by unfit pork purchased and consumed by the plaintiff's
decedent. The court held that though the action may be main-
tained solely for the breach of the implied warranty of fitness,
the breach is a wrongful act and, in its essential nature, a tort.
The Greco case is clearly a distinction from the cases in point
which must determine whether the lex delicti or the lex fori
governs the damages recoverable in an action for wrongful
death.
Death on the High Seas
In 1920, Congress enacted the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act,25 the primary purpose of which was to resolve the
confusion inherent in conflicting state wrongful death statutes.
It was not firmly established, however, until Wilson v. Trans-
ocean Airlines,2 6 that the FDHSA supersedes the state wrongful
death statutes as to actions for death occurring on the high seas.
Full Faith and Credit
In an action for wrongful death occurring in Illinois, the
Wisconsin forum dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
Wisconsin death statute provided that such action may be brought
for a death caused in Wisconsin only, and that a local public
policy had been established against entertaining suits brought
under the wrongful death acts of other states. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court declared that local policy must
yield to the constitutional requirement that full faith and credit
must be given in each state to the public acts of any other state.27
Query, whether the Kilberg case 2 8 on appeal to the highest
court, would be reversed on similar grounds, ergo, that full
faith and credit must be given to the Connecticut death statute
in toto, including its limitation on recovery?
24 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938).
25 41 Stat. 537, 538 (1920), 46 U. S. C. secs. 761-767 (1952). The FDHSA
has no limitation on damages recoverable; recovery is for loss of support.
26 121 F. Supp. 85 (D. C., Cal., 1954).
27 Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N. W. 2d 452 (1950), rev'd 341 U. S.
609 (1951).
28 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra, n. 11.
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Conclusion
The wisdom of the courts is to be found in the effectiveness
of their decisions, which must necessarily follow the basic con-
cepts of law and justice. Any departure from these, however
slight, has an effect upon that steady progress that derives from
continued compliance by every jurisdiction with these basic
concepts.
An act of negligence resulting in a breach of duty imposed
by law is a tort. An act of negligence resulting in a breach of
duty imposed by contract is also a tort. The Patterson court
would have us depart from these principles,
"Procedural rules should be classified as those which concern
methods of presenting to a court the operative facts upon which
legal relations depend; substantive rules, those which concern
the legal effect of those facts after they have been established.
29
By concluding that the remedy in a tort action is a procedural
matter, and consequently governed by the law of the forum, the
Kilberg court has, for the sake of its own public policy, impaired
the steady pace of progress. This could have a contagious effect
upon other jurisdictions, similar to Lord Ellenborough's pro-
nouncement in 1808.30
29 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, sec. 134 (2d ed., 1951).
30 Baker v. Bolton, supra, n. 1
Sept., 1961
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